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Chapter 11
Time Perception and Retirement Saving:
Lessons from Behavioral Decision Research
Gal Zauberman and B. Kyu Kim
Individuals often make financial decisions that are not in their long-term
best interest. One highly consequential example is undersaving for retire-
ment: people often delay initiating or increasing saving programs that they
themselves believe would be beneficial. Indeed, undersaving due to delay
in initiating saving or low contribution rates might only further increase in
its magnitude as a result of the recent financial crisis, which decreased the
value of saving accounts as well as the availability of perceived and actual
‘slack’ in households’ income.
Work in behavioral decision research and behavioral economics has
aimed at identifying the reasons for often poor financial decision-making,
including low retirement saving rates, and what can be done through policy
and by individuals themselves, to facilitate better long-term decisions
(based on individuals’ own stated preferences, as well as commonly accept-
ed levels of what will be required at retirement). In this chapter, we do not
provide a broad review or replicate material covered in other chapters, but
rather we focus on the findings and implications of behavioral research,
examining the underlying psychological processes for retirement saving
(see also Lynch and Zauberman, 2006). In particular, we focus on two key
cognitive mechanisms relevant to this problem. The first relates to how
people represent outcomes (costs and benefits) in the near and distant
future, building on resource slack theory (Zauberman and Lynch, 2005)
and related research on mental representation (Trope and Liberman,
2003; Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006). The second focuses on a perceived
time-based discounting model (e.g., Kim and Zauberman, 2009; Zauber-
man et al., 2009) and examines how people perceive the time horizon itself
(i.e., anticipated duration) between the present and a future target date. In
the following sections, we discuss key implications of these behavioral
tendencies for (a) why people delay setting up and raising retirement
contributions; and (b) possible strategies that might be used to overcome
the tendency for delay.
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Intertemporal choice research and retirement saving
The study of intertemporal choice, decisions that involve a tradeoff between
costs and benefits at different points in time, examines behavioral regula-
rities in how people actually make such decisions compared to normative
discounting models, drawing from psychology, behavioral decision re-
search, and behavioral economics. This extensive literature is relevant to
public policy issues where individuals seem to heavily discount future
consequences, and thus highly relevant for the study of retirement saving
decisions.
In studying intertemporal preferences, researchers often measure indiv-
iduals’ discount rates for delayed future outcomes. For instance, partici-
pants in laboratory and field experiments are presented with a choice
between smaller but immediate rewards and larger but delayed rewards,
and they report the dollar amount making them indifferent between the
immediate and delayed rewards. If someone is indifferent between $100
today and $110 in one year, for this person, the value of $100 in one year is
discounted only by 10 percent for the one-year delay. But if another person
is indifferent between $100 and $1,000 in one year, the person discounts
the value of the same delayed $100 by 900 percent. The higher the
measured level of discounting is, the greater that person discounts out-
comes in the future (e.g., benefits from retirement saving). Thus, this basic
measure of delay discounting has been heavily used and validated as a
measure of impatience and impulsivity (e.g., Green et al., 1994).
This simple notion of temporal discounting is relevant to the issue of low
saving rates in two general ways. First, individual differences in measured
discount rates might reflect stable differences across individuals in their
propensity to save for retirement. Consistent with real-world observations,
many studies of delay-discounting tasks have reported wide individual
difference in observed discount rates (e.g., Green et al., 1994; Kirby,
1997; Kirby et al., 2002; Frederick, 2005; Shamosh et al., 2008). For exam-
ple, in a study by Kim and Zauberman (2009), some participants revealed
no discounting, while some others revealed almost 400 percent discount
rate for the same $75 monetary reward delayed by three months. While
discount rates in these studies are measured for relatively short-term delays
compared to the prolonged periods involved for retirement saving (e.g.,
twenty years), the implication for such decisions is straightforward. Indivi-
duals with high discount rates are less likely to save for their retirement,
because any delayed pleasures that they may derive from their saving will be
heavily discounted. That is, the more than $100 one can spend in the
future by saving $100 today looks much less attractive than $100 one can
spend right now. Of course, for this perspective to be at all relevant, these
individual discounting propensities need to be stable over time and across
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domain problems (e.g., retirement saving, healthy eating, etc.), and both
of these aspects are controversial. Moreover, an individual difference ap-
proach, although it might point to a need for regulation, offers little in the
way of behaviorally influencing individuals’ decisions.
The second, and more central to our discussion, way in which intertem-
poral research might shed light on retirement saving decisions is that such
decisions are highly sensitive to changes in the decision context. For example, the
degree of discounting has been shown to vary depending on whether it is a
gain or a loss, whether the amount is small or large, and whether the task is
to delay a current amount or to expedite a future amount (for a review, see
Frederick et al., 2002). But possibly most relevant for our discussion is the
finding that peoples’ tendency to discount delayed outcomes at different
rates depends on when delay happens. Extensive empirical evidence shows
that, in general, people discount delayed outcomes more heavily when the
delay happens relatively soon (e.g., delaying consumption from today to
tomorrow) than relatively far in the future (e.g., delaying consumption
from 100 days later to 101 days later). That is, although the same outcome
is delayed by the same time interval (e.g., one day), an outcome delayed
one day from today is discounted at a higher discount rate than an outcome
delayed one day from 100 days hence. This phenomenon, often labeled as
hyperbolic discounting, is relevant to the undersaving problem by addressing
why people plan to save in the future but do not do so when it comes to the
time to save their income. Although, from today’s perspective, saving a
certain portion of your future income (or giving up a certain amount of
future pleasure) seems reasonable, when that time approaches and indivi-
duals actually need to save, the cost of saving (or giving up a current
pleasure) seems much larger than when it was originally envisioned be-
cause delaying immediate consumption is discounted more heavily than
delaying consumptions in the future.
Behavioral determinants of temporal discounting
In order to be able to draw lessons from intertemporal choice research, one
must isolate the relevant behavioral mechanism. Understanding the under-
lying processes that give rise to these behaviors can provide a more solid
ground to build policy and interventions. Seeking to identify the psychol-
ogical process, researchers initially focused on affective and visceral influ-
ences on myopic decisions. For instance, Loewenstein (1996) argued that
some rewards are discountedmore heavily than others, when those rewards
satisfy visceral responses such as hunger, thirst, or sexual arousal. Once
such states are activated, immediate consumption that satisfies one’s im-
mediate appetitive responses (or cravings) gets disproportionately higher
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weight compared to all other delayed consumptions that do not, thus
resulting in a hyperbola-like discounting for delayed consumption (Loe-
wenstein, 1996). Multiple examples documented in the literature illustrate
these effects. In one study, participants who would not envision themselves
engaged in morally questionable sexual behavior, reported intention to do
so when they were sexually aroused (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006). Simi-
larly, in the context of food consumption, participants chose more vices
(e.g., chocolate cake) than virtues (e.g., fruit salad) when they lacked
cognitive resources and when rewarding stimuli were more vivid (e.g.,
when faced with the actual presence of dessert vs a picture of it; Shiv and
Fedorikhin, 1999). These results are in line with ‘hot/cool’ systems of delay
of gratification (e.g., Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999), as well as with empirical
demonstrations that substance abusers show high discount rates for de-
layed addictive substances as well as money (Kirby et al., 1999; Baker et al.,
2003). Collectively, these results all point to the idea that, when visceral
states are activated, people tend to ignore delayed future consequences.
While these affective/visceral processes are no doubt relevant to many
real-life decisions such as smoking, impulse buying, or overeating, they may
be less directly applicable to more calculated decisions, such as saving for
retirement or taking out loans. We present later a more cognitive ‘cold’ set
of processes that have received relatively less attention but that we believe
might be helpful in the context of such individual decisions. Specifically,
we propose two distinct cognitive processes explaining myopic financial
decision-making, one centering on the perception of delayed outcomes per se
(e.g., perception of slack or different mental representation of outcomes),
and the other centering on the perception of temporal distance to the outcomes
(e.g., perception of duration until the receipt of delayed outcomes).
Accounts based on time-dependent perceptions
of outcome
Next, we focus on how perceptions of outcomes and resource slack in the
near and distant future impact observed discount rates.
Resource slack theory
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) proposed the concept of perceived ‘re-
source slack’ to explain why different resources might be discounted at
different rates. They defined resource slack as ‘the perceived surplus of a
given resource available to complete a focal task’, and tested slack theory in
the domains of time and money. They found that, on average, people
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expect to have more time in the future, but this optimistic expectation was
less pronounced for money, and as a result, people discount time invest-
ments more than money investments. Importantly, this greater discounting
of time than money was observed only when people expected time (versus
money) slack to grow more in the future. When people expected the
opposite, however, they discounted future money more than future time.
For example, when people expected a future raise, the perceived value of
money was further discounted, resulting in a decrease in their saving. Note
that this could be completely normative, but only when people’s expecta-
tions are not biased, a condition that is often violated.
Beyond just different discount rates for time and money, resource slack
theory also explains hyperbolic discounting and differential hyperbolic
discounting for time versus money. Specifically, if individuals expect
money at time t to be less than that at t + n, and the difference is greater
when t is very near than when it is temporally more distant, they will discount
delayed money at a different rate because of the differences in slack gain.
This is especially true when people anticipate a raise in the future. Even
though they plan to start saving a portion of their raise in the future, as
the timing of the raise comes closer, any delayed consumption looks
painful to them, and thus they will not be as likely to execute on their
promise unless there is binding precommitment, which we will discuss
further later.
Construal level theory
Construal level theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003; Liberman et al., 2007)
provides a different cognitive account for how the representation of near
and distant events can affect intertemporal preferences. Construal level
theory argues that individuals represent events in the distant future at a
relatively high level and events in the near future at a relatively low level.
That is, for near events, people consider concretely the feasibility and the
constraints of events, but for events in the distant future, they think more in
terms of abstract thoughts and focus on the desirability of the same out-
comes. For example, when asked to select assignments to be completed in
the near-term, participants chose the less interesting assignment (a low
desirability with high feasibility option), but when asked to choose for
distant future, participants elect the more interesting but more difficult
assignment (a high desirability with low feasibility option).
Construal level theory provides a cognitive reason for why people would
discount hyperbolically. The pleasure in the future that one can receive by
saving today is construed in a high level, but the duration over which one
needs to forgo the pleasure by saving and the pleasure itself is construed in
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a lower level. Therefore, when deciding whether to spend now, or save and
delay the spending, the delay gets more weight, leading the individual to
seek immediate pleasure rather than save. However, when considering
saving in the future, the amount of pleasure gets more weight than the
pain from delaying it; thus the individual is willing to save his/her income
occurring in the future. As a direct test of this explanation for hyperbolic
discounting, in line with construal level theory, Malkoc and Zauberman
(2006) manipulated participants’ level of construal such that abstract con-
strual of delayed consumption became more concrete, which attenuated
the degree of hyperbolic discounting, supporting the role of construal in
myopic decisions.
Implications for saving
Hyperbolic, or inconsistent, discounters experience intertemporal con-
flicts between when they plan to save in the future and when that day
approaches, and they actually have to follow up on their decisions. When
individuals plan to save, the delayed benefits from saving (vs the opportu-
nity costs of not spending) are discounted relatively little, so future saving
looks attractive. But when the future becomes the present, and people must
decide to save now, the cost of saving (or the pain from giving up consump-
tion) now seems much larger than it seemed from a distance. For this
reason, many behavioral economists have suggested precommitment as a
remedy to this conflict between the current and future selves. That is, by
getting people today to precommit to a desirable action in the future, they
then prevent themselves from yielding to the temptation of spending, even
when the desirable action is no longer perceived as desirable, but instead
perceived as a cost.
Several findings from behavioral decision research account for the effec-
tiveness of such precommitment devices in increasing saving rate. Constru-
al level theory predicts that when people make saving decisions in the
present, short-term costs and constraints loom large, but when they are
given an option to precommit to save their future raise for retirement
saving, the consequence is temporally distant, and as a result, benefits of
saving gets more weight than its costs. The perspective of resource slack
theory also predicts the success of such precommitment device. People
commonly expect that their expenses always just match or fall below their
financial resources, and if they are too cash-constrained today, it is quite
likely that they are just as cash-constrained in the future (as they adjust for
their new income levels). But because people feel that they will have more
financial slack after getting a raise, they are willing to precommit to save in
the future. Resource slack theory further predicts that participants in a
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precommitment program would stick with the plan rather than opt out.
The cost of opting out seems very small when one precommits several
months before a raise is realized, but switching costs turn to be much
more binding when the time arrives to incur them (Zauberman, 2003;
Zauberman and Lynch, 2005). That is, when their raise arrives, people
may wish to opt out, but they procrastinate doing so because they have to
find the time.
Consistent with these predictions, the real-world application of a pre-
commitment device, such as the trademarked plan ‘Save More Tomorrow’
by Thaler and Benartzi (2004), was shown to be very successful. In this plan,
employees were provided with the option to precommit to save a portion of
their future raises for retirement. This program resulted in a significant
increase of employees’ annual retirement saving rate from 3.5 percent to
almost 14 percent in forty months (and they rarely opted out!).
Accounts based on perception of temporal distance
As discussed earlier, most studies of intertemporal decisions and related
models have centered on changes in the perception of outcomes at differ-
ent points in time. They tend to explain hyperbolic discounting by focusing
on why individuals discount the value of outcomes per se at different rates.
Recently, researchers have offered an alternative perspective, pointing to
the importance of separating the effects of the perception of values from
the effects of the perception of delays in temporal discounting (e.g., Read,
2001; Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Killeen, 2009; Kim and Zauberman, 2009;
Zauberman et al., 2009). The argument is that when the two processes are
separated, hyperbolic discounting can be simply explained by diminishing
sensitivity to longer time horizons without making any assumption about
the discounting of future outcomes per se. That is, if delays in the near
future seem longer than delays in the far future, outcomes delayed in the
near future will be discounted at a higher rate than outcomes delayed in
the far future, resulting in hyperbolic discounting. To illustrate this point
more concretely, Zauberman et al. (2009) present the following scenario:
suppose an individual is indifferent among $100 today, $1,000 in one year,
and $2,000 in three years. If his/her perception of time is unbiased
(i.e., they perceive a three-year time horizon as three times longer than a
one-year time horizon), the implied compound annual discount rate for
this person is 230 percent for one year and 100 percent for three years,
indicating present-biased preferences. This is the type of evidence most
commonly reported for hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Thaler, 1981). Now,
suppose that the above consumer has biased subjective time perceptions
such that he/she perceives three years to be only 1.3 times longer than one
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year (as opposed to three times longer). Keeping the discount rate constant
and adjusting the time from three to 1.3 before computing the discount rate,
a discount rate of 230 percent for both the one-year and three-year time
horizons is obtained. In other words, the same set of preferences ($100
today = $1,000 in one year = $2,000 in three years) can be modeled as
accurately by using a constant discount rate with respect to subjective time
as by using declining discount rates with respect to objective time.
An empirical demonstration of this hypothesis was obtained by measur-
ing participants’ perception of various anticipatory time horizons (Kim and
Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman et al., 2009). The authors found that non-
linear functions fit participants’ subjective time estimates better than a
linear function, confirming diminishing sensitivity to time. Furthermore,
they found that annual compound discount rates calculated without con-
sidering participants’ subjective time estimates were decreasing as a func-
tion of time (i.e., hyperbolic discounting), as commonly reported in past
research. But when the subjective time estimates were accounted for,
discount rates were no longer decreasing for most time horizons (i.e.,
rates were consistent with exponential discounting). These results imply
that individuals who show diminishing sensitivity to time may behave as if
they have decreasing discount rates, even if they have constant (i.e., expo-
nential) discount rates over perceived time.
This perceived time-based account of discounting has important impli-
cations for undersaving in retirement. Even when people have the intent to
save for retirement, if they subjectively perceive the retirement very far away
from the present, then they are unlikely to start saving today. As a result,
any remedies to correct their subjective time perceptions would help them
to increase saving. In the following section, we discuss various strategies to
alleviate undersaving.
Changing perceived time to retirement
If temporal discounting can be driven by how people perceive time, then
interventions designed to change subjective perception of future time can
be used as a strategy to increase saving rates. To illustrate the situational
dependence of time perception, we present different factors and discuss
their implications. Previous research shows that sexually arousing stimuli
have been shown to induce steeping discounting of monetary rewards
(Wilson and Daly, 2003; Van den Bergh et al., 2008). To test whether
even the effects of visceral factors might affect discounting as driven by
subjective time perception, Kim and Zauberman (2010) asked heterosexu-
al male participants to rate the attractiveness of the female models taken
from the Victoria’s Secret online catalogue (vs neutral objects) and
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measured their subjective time estimates for twelve anticipatory durations,
ranging from one month to twenty-three months. They confirmed dimin-
ishing sensitivity to time horizons, regardless of whether participants rated
models or neutral objects. Participants who were exposed to the sexually
arousing images, however, perceived the same anticipatory durations to be
longer compared to those who rated the neutral objects. They further
showed that the impact of sexually arousing images on the changes in
temporal discounting is due to the changes in time perception. That is,
participants seeing the models revealed higher discount rates because they
perceived the waiting time until the receipt of delayed rewards to be longer
than those who rated neutral objects did.
While this finding that sexual cues influence temporal discounting
by changing time perception is intriguing on its own and points to the
important role of time perception in delay discounting, it is not directly
applicable to the problem of undersaving for retirement. For financial
decision-making for retirement, where spatial distance information often
accompanies (i.e., people plan to move to a different place when they
retire), more relevant context can be found in a recent study using space–-
time interdependence to influence discounting of monetary rewards.
Specifically, Kim et al. (2010) investigated whether spatial distance to
well-known retirement cities influences participants’ subjective perception
of time until their own retirement. They presented to participants a map of
the United States where seven retirement cities were shown, and they were
asked to memorize the locations of each city. About half of the participants
were asked to imagine that they were going to live in Philadelphia until they
retired and then would move to Gardnerville Ranchos (the long-distance
condition), while the other half imagined moving to Cary (the short-
distance condition) after they retired. When participants’ subjective time
estimates to their retirement were measured, those who imagined moving
to Gardnerville Ranchos subjectively perceived the duration to retirement
to be longer compared to those who imagined moving to Cary. These
findings point to the important role of the context of the decisions,
which can influence subjective perception of future time.
Research on how to shift decisions by changing time perception is only
now emerging, and we can only speculate about its relevance for real
money decisions. The potential implications, however, are intriguing. As
the space manipulations earlier suggest, subtle changes in the message
could alter how long or short a future event (retirement) might seem,
thus changing the propensity to save. One possible extension is to draw
on research on time perception of elapsed time that shows that manipulat-
ing ‘markers’ of time could shift how long or short a given duration seems
(Zauberman et al., 2010). On the basis of this research, we would expect
that when people think about many markers from now to retirement, they
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will think about it as further away, compared to just thinking about the time
until retirement.
Conclusion
This chapter provides a selective review of issues in intertemporal choice
research and possible implications for retirement saving. We focus on two
cognitive mechanisms explaining why the future is discounted: (a) changes
in the perception of delayed outcomes due to changes in mental represen-
tations and perceived slack; and (b) changes in the perception of temporal
distance to delayed outcomes.
Regarding the changes in the perception of delayed outcomes, we re-
viewed two theories of the cognitive underpinnings of discounting: re-
source slack theory and temporal construal theory. In both, the key
implication for practitioners and policymakers trying to increase saving
for retirement is to manipulate people’s temporal perspective. If an action
involves some mixture of costs and benefits, construal level theory suggests
that costs will loom larger in the near term than in the more distant future.
In the near term, the costs may outweigh the benefits, but when viewed
from a greater temporal distance, the costs seem to fade away and the
benefits remain. To induce a pattern of long-term desirable behavior,
one must induce people to precommit to a decision at some point in the
more distant future. If undersaving problems come from underweighting
future costs, then the policy prescription is the opposite: induce people to
make decisions about the future as if the consequences were coming into
effect immediately. From the perspective of resource slack theory, people
imagine having more money slack in the future than they actually earn, so
they mispredict how much of their income they will save in the future.
The other perspective on temporal discounting focuses on changes in
the perceived temporal distance to delayed outcomes. According to this
perspective, factors leading people to perceive their retirement is far away
are less likely to save today because delayed benefits from saving are
discounted to the extent of how long or short they perceive the delay to
be. Although we reviewed two of the most recent demonstration of these
factors (arousal and spatial distance), there are likely other factors that
potentially influence how long they perceive the time to retire. These
factors can be utilized to increase saving rates in various educational and
commercial settings.
In sum, we conclude that better understanding of how people perceive
delayed outcomes and temporal distance to the outcomes is critical to understand-
ing and suggesting prescriptions for problems of retirement undersaving.
Future interventions and public policy analysis will benefit from paying
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close attention to knowledge accumulated in this important area of behav-
ioral research.
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